the ontological argument
The ontological argument, as expounded by Anselm, is purely rational, and seems nothing more than a piece of logic-chopping, albeit very elegant and very determined. It hardly seems likely to convince the sceptic, though clearly Anselm thinks otherwise, as he writes: ‘Not irrationally, then, has the hypothesis of a being a greater than which cannot be conceived been employed in controverting the fool [who believes in his heart there is no God], for the proof of the existence of God: since in some degree he would understand such a being, but in no wise could he understand God.’
What Anselm appears to be saying here is that the definition he’s come up with for God (and he seems very pleased with it), namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, will help the non-believer or fool to take a step towards the understanding of God, since he can at least understand this definition (‘in some degree’) even if he understands not God. For presumably God cannot really be comprehended in a definition, according to Anselm.
It would be easy to get bogged down in this logic-chopping. For instance, Anselm himself writes ‘even if it were true that a being than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived or understood; yet it would not be untrue that a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is conceivable and intelligible. There is nothing to prevent one’s saying ‘ineffable’, although what is said to be ineffable cannot be spoken of. ‘Inconceivable’ is conceivable, although that to which the word ‘inconceivable’ can be applied is not conceivable.’ And so it goes. In fact this isn’t impossible to follow, but after a few pages it does become tedious and you begin to feel that this is all too far removed from the way gods are experienced for those who claim to experience them. Yet still the argument (and the crux of it is the bizarre claim that, since that than which no greater can be conceived must necessarily exist, because if it didn’t exist it couldn’t be that than which no greater can be conceived, since existence is greater than non-existence, God’s existence is therefore necessary and somehow demonstrable by this argument) has been very influential and has had a long run, especially thanks to the advent of another famous rationalist, Descartes, who just might have reinvented it, since he makes no mention of Anselm in his reformulation.
I would tend to agree with Aquinas, Kant and others that these rational lines of thought will have little influence on the sceptic, who sees the issue of gods’ existences as essentially an empirical matter. That’s to say, they’ll resist arguments about necessary existence as a kind of cheat. Schopenhauer dismissed Anselm’s argument as a ‘charming joke’, and it’s hard not to agree, for it doesn’t touch on the point or purpose of this being, or alternative explanations for human existence or indeed anything in the empirical realm. It doesn’t even touch on this supposedly necessary being’s activity (what proof does it provide, for example, of this being’s having a hand in human or universal creation?)
What Anselm appears to be saying here is that the definition he’s come up with for God (and he seems very pleased with it), namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, will help the non-believer or fool to take a step towards the understanding of God, since he can at least understand this definition (‘in some degree’) even if he understands not God. For presumably God cannot really be comprehended in a definition, according to Anselm.
It would be easy to get bogged down in this logic-chopping. For instance, Anselm himself writes ‘even if it were true that a being than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived or understood; yet it would not be untrue that a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is conceivable and intelligible. There is nothing to prevent one’s saying ‘ineffable’, although what is said to be ineffable cannot be spoken of. ‘Inconceivable’ is conceivable, although that to which the word ‘inconceivable’ can be applied is not conceivable.’ And so it goes. In fact this isn’t impossible to follow, but after a few pages it does become tedious and you begin to feel that this is all too far removed from the way gods are experienced for those who claim to experience them. Yet still the argument (and the crux of it is the bizarre claim that, since that than which no greater can be conceived must necessarily exist, because if it didn’t exist it couldn’t be that than which no greater can be conceived, since existence is greater than non-existence, God’s existence is therefore necessary and somehow demonstrable by this argument) has been very influential and has had a long run, especially thanks to the advent of another famous rationalist, Descartes, who just might have reinvented it, since he makes no mention of Anselm in his reformulation.
I would tend to agree with Aquinas, Kant and others that these rational lines of thought will have little influence on the sceptic, who sees the issue of gods’ existences as essentially an empirical matter. That’s to say, they’ll resist arguments about necessary existence as a kind of cheat. Schopenhauer dismissed Anselm’s argument as a ‘charming joke’, and it’s hard not to agree, for it doesn’t touch on the point or purpose of this being, or alternative explanations for human existence or indeed anything in the empirical realm. It doesn’t even touch on this supposedly necessary being’s activity (what proof does it provide, for example, of this being’s having a hand in human or universal creation?)
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